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Abstract 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 have resulted in a 
substantial change in the intent of US government 
policies concerning the Canadian-US border, away from an 
open border perspective toward the intent to highly 
control and secure the border.  For managers on both 
sides of the border tasked with overseeing the 
functioning of the supply chains connecting their cross 
border operations, this change in border policies has led 
to a rethinking of supply chain strategies.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The theme of this conference is “Access, Boundaries and 
Cooperation.”  Our project looks at the functioning of supply 
chains across the Canada-US border.  Unfortunately, this has 
been an area of decreasing access, thickening boundaries and, 
until recently, very little meaningful cooperation.  This state 
of affairs represents a 180 degree shift in thinking about the 
Canada-US border and the importance of its smooth functioning to 
the economies of these two partners in what is still the largest 
bi-lateral trade relationship in the world.  This change in 
perspective, especially on the part of US policy makers, can be 
viewed primarily as the result of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11. 2001.   
 
Our project examines the decision making of managers who make 
the day-to-day decisions supporting this trade relationship.  
There has been much work done on the macro level of broad 
national policies and gross trade figures to describe the health 
of the relationship between Canada and the United States in 
general.  This project is designed to examine the micro level of 
one very specific aspect of that relationship, i.e., the 
decisions made by the buyers and sellers in the links of the 
supply chains that support this massive movement of goods and, 
to a growing extent, services across what used to be the 
“longest undefended international border in the world”. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE CANADA-US RELATIONSHIP 
 
Trade between Canada and the United States 
 
This research project is designed to examine the functioning of 
supply chains across the Canada-US border.  In order to begin, a 
few statistics about this trade will provide some context.  
First of all, it is important to note that the trade between 
Canada and the US is massive.  In 2010, $645.7 billion 
(Canadian) in goods and services crossed the border. That breaks 
down to about $1.8 billion each day.  The Canadian government 
estimates that 1 in 7 Canadian jobs depends on the trade with 
the US. On the US side, 8 million jobs depend on this trade.  
The trade figures for 2010, while slightly off the all-time 
highs seen in 2008, are on the rebound.  There also seems to be 
a decline in the dependence of Canada on trade with the US as 
the percentage of total Canadian imports and exports with the US 
declined from 75% in 2005 to 68% in 2009.  (all figures from 
www.statcan.gc.ca).  
 
The content of that trade is fairly stable. The US sends Canada 
vehicles, machinery and electrical equipment.  Excluding energy, 
Canada sends the US the same. Much of that can be explained by 
the fact that approximately 45% of the trade is intrafirm, i.e., 
subsidiaries of the same firms sending subcomponents back and 
forth across the border.  This is very characteristic of the 
supply chains linking industries across the two countries, 
especially the highly integrated supply chains in the automotive 
industry, located primarily in Ontario, Michigan, Ohio and New 
York.  These interdependent linkages have grown substantially 
since the Auto Pact went into effect in the 1960’s.  The sheer 
intensity of the interdependency of these supply chains can be 
understood by noting that some of the components in the assembly 
of an automobile can cross the border as many as seven times 
before final assembly (Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2009).  
This is clearly an area where managers might feel the need to 
make some changes in the design of these supply chains. 
 
There are also examples of intrafirm trade in other industries, 
such as processed foods.  From the manager’s perspective, the 
degree to which the links in their supply chains are part of the 
same corporate family may decrease the flexibility of their 
choices and impact the nature of the choices made.  As an 
example, while the Ontario apple growers may choose to find new 
customers, an assembly plant in Windsor making subcomponents in 
the auto industry may not be able to choose to sell those 
subassemblies to a different “buyer”.  But the buyer might 
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choose to impose some cost or delivery constraints.  At that 
point the manager in Windsor might decide it is time to move to 
Michigan or at least to build a warehouse in Michigan. 
 
Another aspect of the trade relationship that is often mentioned 
as a critical element is the fact that Canada is the largest 
provider of energy to the United States.   Canada is the largest 
supplier of foreign oil, electricity, natural gas and nuclear 
fuel.  This fact combined with the importance of the automotive 
industry helps to explain the variations in the value of Canada-
US trade.  It is thought that the year-to-year changes in the 
value of Canada-US trade can in large part be accounted for by 
noting the weakening of the automotive sector and volatile 
energy prices.  Thus the changes would not reflect the results 
of strategic shifts in the design of the supply chains.   
 
The Political Environment of Canada-US Trade 
 
The history of the political relationship between Canada and the 
United States throughout the 20th century is one of close 
cooperation and integrated views of appropriate international 
involvement.  As examples, Canada and the United States were 
early members of the United Nations and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Canada and the United States developed 
NORAD in 1958 to provide for the security of North America.  The 
political atmosphere of trust and mutual regard for the future 
set the stage for the economic integration through the Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement in 1988 and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.  All signals from the political arena 
were that cozy economic and commercial networks were in no 
danger of being outlawed. 
 
Unfortunately, the events of September 11, 2001 marked a change 
in the thinking of policy makers in the US.  Specifically as 
this thinking applied to Canada, the fears of the chance of any 
future attacks and the mistaken belief that the 9/11 terrorists 
had come from Canada led to a very dramatic change in how the US 
policy makers viewed the border and anything that crosses it.  
Statements such as the much quoted one by then US Ambassador 
Paul Cellucci that “Security will trump trade” seemed to sum up 
the US attitude about the border.  It appears that this was not 
just rhetoric.  Under George W. Bush, the Department of Homeland 
Security was formed.  The Department has undertaken a series of 
measures aimed at “thickening” the border around the United 
States. 
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In reaction to the need to provide for better security at the 
border while still facilitating cross border activity, a number 
of programs were established.  The Smart Border Accord 
established a series of steps designed to keep the border 
working. It provided for programs such as Free and Secure Trade 
(FAST) to certify truck drivers across the border and NEXUS for 
trusted travelers crossing by car, truck or train. Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) would provide clearance 
for goods.  These programs all came at substantial costs.  The 
Atlantic Provinces Trucking Association estimates that the 
trucking industry in Canada is paying $1 billion per year to 
comply with these new programs.  They estimate that C-TPAT 
compliance alone can cost a company as much as $300,000 (Penty, 
2009).  Balanced against this are estimates from the Canadian 
government that inefficiencies at the Canada-US border account 
for a 1% decline in Canadian GDP or $1.6 billion in 2010.   
 
Although border security seems to dominate the discussion about 
Canada-US trade, there are other important political issues to 
consider.  As an example, labeling laws continue to be a problem 
under the “rules of origin” requirements of NAFTA.  The result 
of these rules is an onerous documentation requirement for all 
those goods crossing the border.  This becomes exacerbated when 
one considers those automotive subcomponents that cross the 
border seven times.  Similarly, the US Department of Agriculture 
requires country of origin labels for imported food products.  
This has resulted in a decrease in the exports of Canadian 
cattle and hogs to the United States. In this case, it is not 
because the meat is considered “unsafe” (as it was during the 
“mad cow” scare).  It is because US importers do not want to do 
the paperwork.  For them, it is easier to find a domestic 
supplier (Armstrong, 2009).   
 
The Socio-Economic Environment 
 
Changes in cross border trade cannot be understood just in terms 
of increased border security.  The good news is that a number of 
studies indicate that the changes in trade are not related to 
increased border security (Burt, 2007; Goldfarb, 2007). While it 
is not the intent of this project to provide an exhaustive 
discussion of all aspects of the external environment of 
decision makers in global supply chains, it is important to note 
two aspects of the socio-economic environment that form an 
important backdrop.  First of all, the United States is in a 
recession.  According to a study sponsored by the Conference 
Board of Canada, the decline in US household spending has 
actually led to a contraction in global trade – the first in 60 
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years (Atunes, 2009)! As was noted,  a vast majority of Canadian 
exports to the United States are in automotive, food and wood 
products.  These three sectors have been very negatively 
impacted by the decline in the US economy.  One way this decline 
has shown up in consumption figures is a precipitous drop in 
household spending.  As residents in the United States are 
cutting back, they are buying less expensive food, not buying 
new cars and not building new houses.  Taking the drop in 
housing starts as an example, this has led to a drop in the 
demand of wood and wood products.  Canada is a major supplier of 
these products when housing is being built.  So, they suffer 
substantially when houses are not being built.  As a matter of 
fact, the Conference Board predicted that the declines in 
domestic demand coupled with the decrease in exports would lead 
to a 1.7% decrease in real GDP in 2009. 
 
The second point to make concerns the strength of the Canadian 
dollar.  The Canadian dollar has strengthened against the US 
dollar over the early part of the 21st century.  Some preliminary 
economic research has indicated that these changes have not had 
a negative impact on cross border trade (Sundell & Shane, 2006).  
However, managers often cite exchange rates as a major factor in 
their decisions concerning supply chain partners (Gessner & 
Snodgrass, 2005).  Consequently, the impact of the changes in 
the exchange rate should be kept in mind as behaviors of supply 
chain managers are studied. 
  
The “Reality” of the Border 
 
Both the recession and the exchange rate are outside the control 
of individual managers and for most managers consideration of 
them is not part of their daily reality.  What is real is the 
border.  Anyone who lives within a few miles of any of the 
important border crossings between Canada and the United States 
is very familiar with the headlines and stories about what is 
happening at the border.  “Border Crossings Slide” declares 
Buffalo Business First in an article decrying the decline in US 
customers at Niagara Falls, Ontario hotels, casinos and theater 
(Fink, 2009).  “New Rules Crimp Canada Ties” laments The Buffalo 
News in an article on the impact of the new border rules that 
have led to a drop in trips across the Peace Bridge – 
conceivably for the first time in its 82 year history (Fairbanks 
& Hayden, 2009).  The article does go on to say that the 
recession and lousy weather may also have had an impact.  
“Border laws taking toll on business, groups say” reports on the 
joint efforts of the Canadian and American Chambers of Commerce 
to influence US policy makers (Zremski, 2009). 
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But it is not just the owners of bed & breakfasts, restaurants 
and tourist attractions who are seeing the negative impact of 
border security.  Supply chain managers are also feeling the 
impact.  As mentioned before, the costs of compliance with the 
border management programs such as FAST and C-TPAT are 
significant.  It is also necessary for shippers to be members of 
programs on both sides of the border.  These requirements plus 
the costs of border delays can cost a company as much as $1 
million per year.  The costs of the border are also combined 
with the paperwork burden that comes from such requirements as 
the “rules of origin” under NAFTA.  Some transportation 
companies such as Purolator Corporation publish white papers to 
try and help customers prepare for the challenges of dealing 
with the Canada-US border.  Other transportation companies have 
added accessorial charges to cover the additional costs of 
crossing the border.  A study by the Canadian and American 
Chambers of Commerce (2009) cites the example of automotive 
industry and its integrated supply chains in North America. They 
compare the paperwork burden for a shipment of 4,000 fully 
assembled foreign cars into the United States.  That shipment 
would require one customs clearance form.  A shipment of 4,000 
vehicles that are assembled in Canada and the United States – 
therefore crossing the Canada-US border as many as seven times 
until final assembly – would require as many as 28,000 customs 
and security clearance forms.  And the cost burden of that does 
not even count the costs of border delays!  
 
The point is that the core of the relationship between Canada 
and the United States seems to be defined in terms of the 
border.  Changes in that relationship are manifest in changes in 
border policy.  Changes in cross border business result from 
these changes in border policy.  These changes are critical for 
Canadian managers.  As an example, in 2005 as much as 38% of 
Canadian GDP was exports and 34% of GDP was imports.  Canada is 
an exporting nation and exports mean there is a border.  But 
historically the United States is not really a trading nation.  
So, the decision variables of US managers in cross border supply 
chains are not necessarily the same as those of their Canadian 
partners.  The next part of this paper will explore the US side 
of the supply chains. 
 
US PURCHASING MANAGERS AND THEIR CANADIAN SUPPLIERS 
 
In the supply chains that cross the Canada-US border, many of 
the decisions about managing the relationships are made by the 
US Purchasing Managers who represent the large customers 
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assembling subcomponents from their Canadian suppliers.  One of 
the issues for Canadian suppliers in their relationship with 
their US customers is the fear that increased border security 
would negatively impact their “attractiveness” as suppliers 
because the costs of compliance with border security programs 
are so high and the delays at the border would lead to 
volatility in their delivery schedules.  Macro level research on 
variations of trade volumes as a function of increased border 
security indicates there has not been a negative impact on trade 
between Canada and the United States (Burt, 2007). 
 
Another study examined the question of whether or not the impact 
of heightened border security has just not shown up yet 
(Goldfarb, 2007).  This study also indicated that there had not 
been a decrease in Canada-US trade related to increased border 
security.  However, the report also indicated that the Canadian 
firms in the study had seen increased costs related to the need 
to comply with new border security programs and they had assumed 
those costs internally. Thus the US customers had not seen an 
increase in their costs of supplying out of Canada and were 
therefore not motivated to change suppliers.  However, the 
Canadian suppliers were realizing lower profit margins. 
 
Our study examined the decision making of US Purchasing Managers 
regarding their Canadian suppliers (Gessner & Snodgrass, 2005).  
Their responses indicate that exchange rates were their most 
important factor in deciding to use Canadian suppliers (45% of 
respondents).  Clearly costs are paramount on their minds.  
Their second reason is the opportunity to develop new business 
(34% of respondents).  These US Purchasing Managers view their 
supply chain partners as assets to be used for their long term 
viability.  Traffic problems (11%) and security issues (3%) were 
not viewed as problems for the US managers. 
 
The US Purchasing Managers were also asked about their perceived 
impact of increased border security.  Only 24% reported a 
noticeable impact and 3% a great impact on their cross border 
business.  They were also asked about the cost impact of 
increased border security.  Their responses show that 53% 
thought the impact was less than 1% or none while another 18% of 
the respondents didn’t know.  When asked about specific problems 
related to the border, 59% of the respondents cited longer wait 
times as the number one problem. When asked what they planned to 
do to solve any problems related to the functioning of their 
cross border supply chains, 35% of the respondents indicated 
they would seek a domestic supplier.  The triggers for their 
decisions indicate that 59% of the respondents were concerned 
Coral R. Snodgrass and Guy H. Gessner 
8 
 
that longer waiting times at the border would lead to difficulty 
in maintaining Just-In-Time schedules and would increase 
inventory costs.   
 
The conclusions to be drawn from these studies for Canadian 
Managers are not discouraging but they do indicate the need for 
some strategic rethinking.  Clearly, there has not been an 
immediate change in the supply chains across the Canada-US 
border related to the increased border security requirements.  
Trade between the two countries is still robust.  Changes in the 
volume of trade seem to be related more to the wider economic 
forces related to the recession in the United States and the 
wider impact of that economic decline.  Further, it is the case 
that much of the trade across the border is intrafirm trade 
supported by supply chains that are not expected to change 
quickly.  However, there are concerns that even those supply 
chains may hit a “tipping point” at which changes would be made.  
Further, it seems that one of the reasons that US Purchasing 
Managers have not made changes is because their Canadian 
suppliers are bearing the costs of compliance with border 
security programs. 
 
It would appear from this research that US Purchasing Managers 
are concerned about timely delivery as well as total delivered 
cost.  Both of those variables are subject to negative impact 
from border issues in terms of both border delays and costly 
compliance.  If those two variables become problems, it is clear 
that US Purchasing Managers will seek domestic suppliers.  It 
also can be deduced from these studies that US Purchasing 
Managers believe it is the task of the Canadian Suppliers to 
make this work.   
 
The implications for Canadian firms are that they need to begin 
to develop strategies to secure their place in their supply 
chains.  This might include actions designed to integrate them 
further into North American supply chains. Or it might require a 
rethinking.   
 
CANADIAN SUPPLIERS AND THEIR US CUSTOMERS 
 
In order to examine the reactions of Canadian managers, we 
undertook a small study to ask about their relationships with 
their US customers.  The size of the data base does not allow 
for rigorous statistical testing. However, there are some 
interesting findings that are worth mentioning.  First of all, 
the responses confirm the importance of total delivered costs to 
their success.  All of the respondents indicated that total 
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delivered costs were either critical (70%) or very important 
(30%) to their ability to maintain their customers.  Timely 
deliveries across the border did not seem as important.   
 
The second interesting result is that there does not seem to be 
much movement in the geographic makeup of these firms’ supply 
chains.  By and large, they are located and competing in Canada 
and the United States. There was very little indication that 
even Mexico was figuring into their decision making.  The 
respondents do, however, find the threat of low cost competition 
to be either critical (9%) or very important (64%) to their 
ability to compete globally. 
 
The third interesting result is the fact that the respondents 
found Canadian government regulations – either the multiple 
jurisdictions within Canada or the differences between Canada 
and other countries – to be critical (45% and 36%) or very 
important (19% and 27% respectively).   
 
It may be speculated that some of these results are a function 
of the fact that the respondents are firms dealing directly at 
the Canada-US border and they have a constrained market reach.  
Nonetheless, they provide some direction for future research. 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
During the development of the background research for this 
project, a number of key events occurred. On February 4, 2011 
Barack Obama and Stephen Harper issued a joint declaration on a 
“Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness.”  The declaration affirmed the importance of 
trade to the Canadian and US economies and recognized the need 
to find ways to make the border work.  On December 7, 2011, 
these same two gentlemen announced the agreement on two action 
plans:  The Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness and the Action Plan on Regulatory Cooperation.  
The first Action Plan addresses key problems at the border and 
aims to facilitate legitimate border crossings while also 
increasing security.  The first key element of this action plan 
designed to alleviate problems at the border are new screening 
procedures for international shipments at the first port of 
entry under the “Cleared once, accepted twice” concept.  This 
would eliminate the present requirement to rescreen shipments.  
The second feature calls for expanded membership in such trusted 
traveler and trader programs as NEXUS and FAST.  The third calls 
for infrastructure improvements to help make these programs work 
– such as expanded number of NEXUS lanes.  Action plans such as 
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those proposed should take much of the burden off of the actual 
Canada-US border crossing and move the border out to the 
perimeter of North America. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our study was undertaken to examine the decision making of US 
and Canadian managers concerning their global supply chains in 
the face of increased security at the Canada-US border.  The 
results from the US managers indicate that they are shifting the 
burdens of security compliance to their Canadian suppliers.  The 
problem for the Canadian Suppliers is that there is no clear 
answer as to the best course of action they can take to maintain 
their positions in their existing supply chains or the ones they 
want to develop. So while policy makers on both sides of the 
border work out the details of border management routines 
designed to facilitate trade, Canadian Managers are going ahead 
with whatever they have to do to stay in business.  Two articles 
from the Buffalo News tell of a logistics firm from Toronto 
opening a facility in Wheatfield, near Buffalo, New York and of 
another machine tool company moving its factory from Cambridge, 
Ontario to Wheatfield (Glynn, 2010; Prohaska, 2009).  It is 
these operational level decisions by the managers in the 
trenches of global supply chain management that will provide the 
best information on the shape these supply chains will take in 
the future. 
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